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REMARKS ON PERSONNEL

The staff of the Central Intelligence Group as activated by  
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(8 February 1946) totalled [redacted] persons. These

*drawn equally*

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were from the State and Navy Departments who supplied [redacted] each and

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from the War Department (including the Air Corps) who supplied [redacted].

The personnel were divided into three units; the Central Reports

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Staff with a T/O of [redacted] the Central Planning Staff of [redacted] and the

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Administrative Section of [redacted]

Not all of them came to duty at once, the build-up was gradual  
as office space and equipment could be found, and the assignments  
to the Group could be put through channels.

It should be noted that with a few exceptions, this staff was  
new to intelligence work. Certain divisions of OSS prior to its  
termination by the Executive Order of 20 September 1945 had been  
transferred to the State and War Departments. These were the Re-  
search and Analysis Branch transferred to State and the divisions  
engaged in clandestine operations which the War Department took over  
on a caretaker basis and designated as Strategic Services Unit.

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to be borne by the three interested agencies; at the start the Group had no budget of its own and no authority to disburse the funds put at its disposal. Suitable arrangements for the hiring and firing of personnel and their payment were made some months later.

The relatively orderly growth of the early years is due in part to lack of recognition of the vital importance of the Agency to national security. The budget was gradually increasing as the staff grew in size and additional functions were assigned to the Agency, but it is proper to say that a sense of urgency was lacking. Two reports had been made by extraneous investigators - the "Dulles Report" especially had examined the organization in detail, but despite the call for a more aggressive policy, little change was apparent in the atmosphere.

A criticism in the Dulles Report was that the administrative functions of the Agency often took precedence over the operational functions. The former who should be the hand-maid tended to become the mistress. A "table of organization" became a sacred edifice not

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clamoring for increased numbers with which to perform their allotted tasks.

There resulted an attitude of sitting on the lid which was perhaps intensified by the insulation of DCI by an Executive who wished to keep matters in his own hands. [?]

Despite the insistent demands for staff increases, no systematic effort was made to satisfy them. Personnel Procurement was confined to the efforts of 3 or 4 men "on the road". One recruiter was sta-

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tioned in [REDACTED] with an office in his hat, and even he was not infrequently called on to cover assignments in other parts of

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the [REDACTED]. There was no organized attempt to give priority to the search for given types or professions who seemed to be most needed. Also, much effort was wasted in the pursuit of individuals who had been vaguely recommended to important officials by V.I.P.'s who seemed to know intuitively the wants of the Agency. Most such sorties after quarry were fruitless.

Something like order was maintained in the canvas of business

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colleges, where men unaffected by the Draft might be pondering a career. However, supply was invariably below demand and continued in fairly even ratio.

The chief spring at which the thirst for personnel was quenched proved for long to be the humble room on the first floor of North Building to which applicants came in search of jobs. Their daily numbers varied almost as much as their quality. On some days the interviewers would be overwhelmed with both work and discouragement; again more than a few likely (and pulchritudinous) candidates would be pounced upon. At one time a high percentage of personnel requisitions were filled by this means.

The delay resulting from the necessity for security clearance often proved a handicap, but many of those recruited for clerical jobs were put on the payroll and set to work in a "Pool" at 939 D Street, N.W. There they performed tasks useful to the Agency but had no access to classified material. In most cases this solved the problem of keeping people on ice during their investigation.

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had to contend was that Head Office gave them almost no reports about the progress in processing of some individual of importance who, after solicitation, had agreed to join the Agency. Routine in clearance, at best sluggish and vexatious, was often complicated by the disappearance of the file itself or of papers which had been sought for its completion. Delays resulted beyond the bounds of endurance and caused many a prospect to withdraw his offer of services, ~~dis-~~  
~~missed~~. These errors and misfortunes were due to several causes each of which was contributory to somewhat mournful result. First was a lack of disciplined routine which should have seized a file in its tentacles and never abandoned it before the many stages of processing had been rigidly accomplished. This lack of order can be partially accounted for by the absence of sufficient trained personnel to carry on the work. Second, the lack of properly arranged office space rendered next to impossible the orderly passage of a file from one section to another. It was impossible to bring home to the tailing staff that a file represented a person suitable for employment;

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manila folder itself. (To a teller in a bank, currency is just so much paper.)

Throughout this period of uncoordinated effort, there was no grumbling over long hours or other lack of good will shown to the job in hand. The expansion of the Agency was simply getting ahead of the physical abilities to cope with it.

Of course, only a relatively small proportion of "mail" applicants had been solicited, most of them made application on the theory that the Agency might be a refuge for them in time of trouble. In many cases, very little information was given by an applicant in a preliminary inquiry. As standard operating procedure, the applicant was sent the complicated and detailed forms required for security clearance. In due course when these were returned, the process began known as "shopping the file." This involved examination by the "Placement" officers of the Personnel Department who determined whether or not the applicant's attributes dovetailed with the requirements of a given office. Very often they did not, so - often

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first examiner and rerouted by Placement to a second or third seeker after personnel. A space of sixty days might well elapse without decision being reached as to whether or not an applicant might be suitable for employment. This vegetating of a file without attention being given it was partially corrected through insistence by Placement that it had to be returned on or before a date stamped on it in large letters, but even then the prospective employer, burdened with other duties, was loath to take action. Placement might have speeded the filling of the gaps had it received more authority, but it was not permitted to assign personnel over the grade of GS-5 without an interview by the requisitioning office. However, in the many cases where the applicant and the job seemed to show likelihood of amicable union, the interested office initiated a request for employment, and the security check began.

Not so, though, with the applicants who had neither training nor talent for the unfilled places. Their files were put aside for the dispatch of a letter of regret. As it was more important to let peo-

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delays occurred in completing this routine. This caused inquiry from the applicant which resulted in still more backlog of correspondence. Not a few people became disgusted.

In the case of applicants arriving with some form of introduction from a member of the Congress, procedures ran more smoothly. Applicants came first to the Office of General Counsel where they were courteously received and sent on for interview to the Recruitment Section. A card file was maintained regarding their progress. If an applicant was accepted, his sponsor was immediately advised and thanked. Where no place available, a letter of regret was dispatched, explaining that personnel of particular qualification was required. In few, if any, instances was there attempt to exert political pressure in placing an applicant in CIA. The politeness and promptitude with which correspondence was answered seemed to satisfy all parties to the issue.

In June, 1951, a reorganization was effected in the Personnel Procurement Division and its staff considerably increased. Recruitment

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This enabled the personnel wants of the Agency to be systematically recruited by an adequate number of high grade men covering many separate and specialized fields. It must always be borne in mind that many of the places still open are very hard to fill because in the normal course of affairs few people could hardly have thought of obtaining profitable employment in such out-of-the-way tasks. Another difficulty is the number of otherwise suitable persons who fail to meet the security tests, and often on whom much time and trouble has been spent in vain.

#### "Side Door" Applicants

Not infrequently a number of the staff is likely to learn of some friend of unusual qualifications who can become available. As a result an informal interview is arranged, very often in a covert office. The interview may or may not be productive of result: a place may not be open at the moment; the aspirant hesitates to commit himself; one thing or another may keep the skein unknotted. However, in most cases the Personnel Division is not advised that conver-

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proposed engagement. The matter is allowed to rest and perhaps become nearly forgotten, when it is suddenly revived. Sometimes a prospect who has failed to sell his services in one spot will try another. There ensues no little confusion when Personnel is given official cognizance of the applicant only to discover that much has already gone before to which they were not privy. These incidents usually break out at a fairly high level of the Agency. Personnel is unjustly blamed for stupidity and errors of omission which are actually due to failure to conform to routine practice. As a rule, however, no great harm is done and such cases as afford embarrassment are dwindling.

**Military Personnel**

Personnel from the Armed Services assigned to CIA is handled by a separate division only indirectly under the Personnel Department.

The policy of the Agency has been [in general] to look with disfavor on applicants who have been receiving temporary deferment and

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applications are rejected. It sometimes happens, however, that an applicant with special qualifications is willing to accept, after training, immediate overseas duty of a hazardous nature. In these cases arrangements are made with the local draft boards to exempt a draftee from call, on the advice from the Agency that he is usefully employed. This system has not been abused and works smoothly.

A considerable number of men in the Armed Services whether regular or reserve have qualifications that are specially desired by the Agency. These may be officers or enlisted men of almost all ranks. As a rule, the criterion is made that assignment of military personnel must be based on the fact that a given place cannot be filled from civil life. Under this condition request for assignment to the Agency is made.

Within an agreed limit, requests are usually granted. Military personnel is subject to the same security check as all other employees. Up to well into 1952, they continued to be paid by the service to which they were attached.

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presents various complications. Those who have been retired for disability incurred in combat may continue to receive their retirement pay in addition to whatever salary may be paid them by CIA.

Those retired for disability not received in combat must forego retirement pay while employed by CIA and in effect work for a very small net return.

Public Law 53-82nd Congress (An amendment to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949) permits the employment of not more than fifteen officers, retired for reasons other than the above who must forego either their retired pay or compensation by the Agency. The provisions of this law have been used sparingly and under the personal control of DCI. The law, however, has enabled the Agency to obtain services of great value from officers of general or flag rank, who otherwise would have been unavailable.

#### Covert Personnel

The procedure for employment of covert personnel is usually similar at the outset to the overt offices. Personnel Procurement both

locally and on the road covers both categories. However, interviews

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
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#### Contract Personnel

During a time when T/O's were not only inflexible but also difficult to expand, the custom grew up of employing personnel on a contract basis. This enabled an office to fill a position rapidly pending such time as allowance could be made for it in the next T/O. Contract employees were subjected to the same security check required for regular staff, but enjoyed no privileges inherent to usual employment. They were paid from unvouchered funds.

A high on contract personnel was reached on 31 December 1951 with 25X1A

so employed. As circumstances have changed the number has tended

to diminish and a contract is now used only in unusual circumstances.

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Many of those so employed previously have been absorbed in the regular course of growth of the Agency.

#### Consultants

Still another group of employees are those employed on a part-time basis as consultants. These are men eminent in professional or commercial life whose special knowledge and training may be useful to the Agency. Consultants are subjected to security clearance. The amount of time placed at the disposal of the Agency varies greatly in accordance with demand. Sometimes a consultant will spend three or four days a week at the Agency; again his advice will be sought only occasionally. Consultants are paid on a per diem basis - from \$30 to \$50 - plus travel allowance and \$9 a day for expenses. The number of consultants employed varies with the demand for special requirements.

The inrush of new employees prevented in large measure the digestion and settlement of personnel problems. There has rarely been

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traversed with the hope of avoiding the pitfalls still ahead.

In any organization where expansion is both rapid and immense, orderly procedure is bound to suffer. With quantities of new blood being pumped into the organization from October, 1950, it was not at first fully appreciated that systems capable of coping with some hund-

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[REDACTED] The crying demand for more and more personnel could not be met by a staff already fatigued and undermanned. Nor was it realized immediately that the relative competence of those charged with administration was not in proportion to the increasing importance and burden of the task.

When the present DCI assumed office 7 October 1950, he brought with him as an assistant a man skilled in reorganization, who, after a time, was able to make up his mind as to the wheels within wheels in the Agency. In so large and diversified an enterprise it was by no means easy to determine what priorities were pre-eminent, but in the short space of a few months he got the ship steadied and proceeding under a good head of steam. What interested him most, however,

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was the ship rather than the crew. His tour of duty was comparatively short as he had volunteered to stand in for a successor who, occupying a high position in affairs, could not immediately divorce himself from them.

In February, 1951, however, this gentleman found himself free to serve, and on 1 April 1951 was appointed Deputy Director (Administration), a post to which his predecessor had been designated on 1 December 1950, [REDACTED] 25X1A

With a profound sense of organization the DD/A rapidly took stock of how things were going - or were not going. On an organizational level with the Deputy Director (Plans) (who was responsible for the operational offices), DD/A had charge of all activities such as Personnel, Finance, Procurement and the numerous outgrowths of these primary functions. To Personnel his attention was directed from almost the outset as being most in need of stimulation and readjustment. As is not uncommon in large enterprises, the chief officer of the Personnel Division did not enjoy the rank or prestige of the Assistant

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prevailed on a man of great good sense and ability to accept a post with the title of Assistant Director with the duty of undertaking to restore the somewhat shattered morale of the staffs handling personnel.

This Assistant Director agreed to take on the job for a period of six months, during which some progress was made in bettering the assimilation of various undigested problems. It is regretted that, for personal reasons, he found it impossible to continue. The position is being filled presently (April, 1952) part time by the Director of Training who, as the saying goes, is wearing two hats, but there can be no doubt that the job is big enough to occupy full time some highly competent man.

The Assistant Director for Personnel - or whatever title may be given him - must stand essentially between the countless souls making up the Agency and the DCI. He must enjoy the complete confidence of his chief and be strong enough to stand up to criticism no matter from what source. He must be to the humble people at their routine

tasks the embodiment of that shadowy figure, the DCI, who is mystically

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respected by all, but so withdrawn from ordinary contacts that the spirit of his leadership is largely lost.

A feeling of pride in the Agency can be aroused through a sympathetic build-up by a visible representative of the Director who continuously conveys the idea that he is close to the throne and is the chief intermediary between the head of the organization and its throbbing heart.

#### Morale

One of the principal factors in the maintenance of morale is that people must like their jobs, be reasonably good at them, show gradual improvement and be busy enough to feel they have done a good day's work. To learn a job thoroughly involves training. This in turn involves the necessary time for teaching, and for this last there has rarely been opportunity. In certain parts of the Agency, it is true that personnel has been recruited for the purpose of performing certain tasks of a technical nature requiring natural aptitude and thorough instruction. This type of employee is trained as well as past experience and intelligent supervision will allow. On

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completion of a given course these people are expected to know what to do and how to do it.

But in a large number of cases, especially with clerical personnel, the demand for immediate employment has been so imperative there has been no time for training except, in principle, "on the job." The result is that efficiency is lost because willingness cannot remedy lack of experience and often immediate superiors may be unskilled as instructors. What happens, therefore, is that people grow discouraged through feeling themselves ineffective. These conditions have been recognized and effort is being made to overcome them by a closer tie between the Personnel and Training Offices which have hitherto been sharply separated.

Eventually each employee after clearance will undergo a course of training particularly designed for whatever a future assignment may be. However, there is still much ground to be covered.

Another morale depressant is a tendency, prevalent among young college graduates, to regard a job as beneath their training and

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of a degree, say in sociology, that their utility to the Agency is at best meagre and they are unlikely to be allotted a task which is precisely what they wish. But they shy away from typing or filing as sordid and trivial without in the least realizing they are acquiring the invaluable experience of learning to work accurately under pressure. The better ones settle down and often find their niche, but there is much discomfiture among those who have held their noses too high in the air.

It is almost impossible in the multiple pursuits of the Agency to distribute the work load evenly. Some offices are invariably busy, others undergo pressure by fits and starts. Yet each unit endeavors to staff itself on the basis of a constant strain upon its entire force. This sometimes results in overstaffing and thoughtless dissemination of duties, so that a portion of the staff may at times have very little to do. And unless people are kept reasonably busy they tend to get discouraged.

With the insatiable demand for filling the slots in the ever in-

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for which they were not particularly fitted either by experience or or inclination. Very often, however, people suited themselves so readily to the task in hand that their chiefs were reluctant to give them other assignment and in many instances what seemed like more inviting positions were filled by newcomers rather than through promotion. This tended to make people lose faith in their chances for advancement and inclined them to a dim view toward what might lie in store. For months at a time while the numbers piled up, no orderly system was established of evaluating individual capacity or of granting promotion to the alert and deserving. Some progress is now being made in this regard but it will take time to overcome the neglect of a principal foundation on which esprit de corps must be raised.

Another morale factor from which CIA personnel suffer is its enforced isolation. By regulation, by exhortation, by example, I & S is continuously drilling into the staff the compulsion to be close-mouthed. People are required to stick together within and without the Agency; contact with outsiders is frowned upon as contaminating.

As a result in the hours devoted to leisure, constraint is placed

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on many activities and modest enjoyments to which other agencies have ready access. Effort is being made to develop recreation programs within the Agency, but the fact remains that a considerable number of the staff feel themselves cut off from the rest of the world and are inclined to miss the freer intercourse of organizations where security is not paramount.

Naturally, the morale of units will vary, depending on the character of the chiefs and their ability to regard the members of the staff as individuals. There is too frequent a tendency to withhold praise for a job well done - as if this was always to be expected - and to condemn intemperately errors and omissions which often result from inexperience or undue pressure. A little more tolerance of human frailty might be shown to people who, on the whole, are giving of their best.

It must be recalled, too, that CIA is essentially a civilian agency; a large proportion of the staff are unused to the disciplines and chains of command which prevail in the military establishments.

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fear of punishment or hope of reward). A considerable number of the male staff have served in the armed forces and are used to the extravagances of military regulation. Nevertheless, they do not relish it, and the ladies find it hard to take. The comfortable feeling that supervision and direction are genial is lacking. Patience and understanding could supplant impatience and reproach to advantage.

#### New Building

Though problems of personnel management are perhaps only indirectly affected, the greatest disadvantage under which CIA labors is the terrible inconvenience of its quarters. The Agency is now housed in 28 office buildings in several areas which are often widely separated. Where several buildings adjoin, attempt has been made to have them shelter the larger units but even then conditions of overcrowding make it difficult to allow for future expansion. One consequence is that smaller units are constantly on the move, having to abandon their work spaces to demands of more powerful insistence.

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almost invariably result, for everyone concerned, in still greater inconvenience than before.

Some units naturally have a good deal to do with each other; in the regular course of the day's work there is a steady stream, back and forth, of members of the respective staffs. Often these units cannot be located within a relatively compact area, so getting to and fro involves a good many footsteps. For contact with more distant parts of the Agency a shuttle-bus service saves footsteps but involves an equal if not greater expenditure of time. Many man-hours a day are spent just in "proceeding." Add to this the messenger and courier services and the distribution of mail which are similarly retarded and it becomes apparent that routine transactions are the victims of daily harassment.

Proposals for a single new building for the Agency have long been considered without result, though it is hoped favorable action may eventually be forthcoming. Tentative figures show that savings  
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in operation would amount to some [REDACTED] a year. (Guard Service

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alone would save more than [REDACTED]. It is perhaps unfair to emphasize as an inducement to efficiency that such a building would be air-conditioned, but marked conservation of physical resources is known to result.

But apart from savings fiscal or physical, the intangible improvement in getting through the day's grind would be incalculable. An orderly flow of work could be established. People could be given elbow room. Offices with closely related duties could become neighbors. The staff would come to recognize one another as individuals instead of voices or signatures. Countless memoranda would be forborne as personal contacts supplanted them and opposing viewpoints could be reconciled more readily. Personnel problems would grow simpler as accessibility became a reality. Much benefit to the esprit de corps would accrue.

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